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This paper examines voluntary provision of a public good that is motivated, in part, to compensate
for other activities that diminish the public good. Markets for environmental offsets, such as those
that promote carbon neutrality to minimize the impact of climate change, provide an increasingly salient
example. An important result, related to one shown previously, is that mean donations to the public
good do not converge to zero as the economy grows large. Other results are new and comparable to
those from the standard model of a privately provided public good. The Nash equilibrium is solved
explicitly to show how individual direct donations and net contributions depend on wealth and heterogenous
preferences. Comparative static analysis demonstrates how the level of the public good and social
welfare depend on the technology, individual wealth, and an initial level of the public good. Application
of the model in an environmental context establishes a starting point for understanding and making
predictions about markets such as those for carbon offsets.
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Why do individuals voluntarily provide public goods? The question has re-
ceived much attention in the economics literature, and two general answers have
emerged. The ￿rst is based on a standard model of private provision of a pure
public good. Agents are assumed to bene￿t from the aggregate level of a public
good and thus have some incentive for private provision. While the additional
incentive to free ride ensures that the equilibrium level of the public good will fall
short of the Pareto-e¢ cient level, the theory nevertheless predicts some degree of
voluntary provision.1
The second explanation has grown out of the need to reconcile why observed
levels of private provision regularly exceed those that the standard theory pre-
dicts. Research in this area can be characterized broadly as re￿nements or ex-
tensions on the impure public good model. The general approach is to assume
that agents obtain a private bene￿t from some aspect of their own provision,
and this encourages provision beyond that which would occur if bene￿ts came
from only the public good itself. Di⁄erent interpretations of the private bene￿t
range from a feeling of ￿warm-glow￿satisfaction, social approval, prestige, and
signaling about income.2
The present paper pursues a further explanation for voluntary provision of
a public good. The idea is that provision may occur, in part, to o⁄set other
activities that have an adverse e⁄ect on a public good. Consider an activity that
produces a negative externality through diminishment of a public good. Assum-
ing the individual cares enough about the public good, she may seek to minimize
her adverse e⁄ect on it. One possibility is for the individual to voluntarily re-
strain her behavior.3 Another possibility, which need not be mutually exclusive,
is for the individual to o⁄set some (or all) of her detrimental e⁄ect through direct
provision of the public good.
Examples of voluntary provision motivated in this way are increasingly com-
mon in an environmental context. Perhaps the most prominent example comes
from the increased popularity of carbon o⁄sets. Individuals and institutions that
are concerned with their emissions of carbon dioxide, which contribute to climate
change, have opportunities to make direct donations that help reduce emissions
1Samuelson (1954, 1955) is widely recognized for his pioneering work on this model. More re-
cent and standard references that employ a game-theoretic approach include Bergstrom, Blume
and Varian (1986), Andreoni (1988), and Cornes and Sandler (1996).
2Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1994, 1996) develop the general impure public good model,
and references that are described here as re￿nements or extensions include Glazer and Konrad
(1986), Hollander (1990), Andreoni (1990), Harbaugh (1998), and Kotchen (2005).
3See Kotchen and Moore (in press) for empirical evidence of voluntary restraint with respect
to household electricity consumption and air pollution emissions.
1elsewhere. Currently, there are at least 53 nonpro￿t and commercial organiza-
tions that specialize in providing opportunities for carbon o⁄sets, which typically
involve investments in renewable energy and reforestation programs.4 While in-
terest in purchasing carbon o⁄sets is clearly on the rise, participants in the market
already include individuals, governments, and industry.5
It is easy to conceive of other, more general, charitable activities as being
motivated with the idea of an o⁄set in mind. Anecdotal examples include a real
estate developer who donates land for a park, or a shrewd investor who makes a
large donation to clear his conscience. It is also the case that acts in violation of
one￿ s religion that require monetary penance, such as the forbiddance of gambling
by Islam, are consistent with the notion of donations as an o⁄set.
This paper is not the ￿rst to consider private provision of a public good to
o⁄set a bad. Vicary (2000) modi￿es the impure public good model to account
for an impure public bad, that is, an activity that diminishes the level of a
public good. His model also permits individuals to make direct donations to the
public good as a compensating mechanism. The model is then used to answer the
question of what happens to donations in a large economy. Vicary ￿nds, contrary
to the standard model with a pure public good, that a substantial proportion of
the population can be donors in an economy with many individuals. This result
is useful because it provides a theoretical basis for donations that more closely
matches the empirical evidence.
The model developed here begins with the same basic idea but, in contrast,
generalizes the pure public good model. This more parsimonious setup has the
advantage of making comparisons with the standard model more direct and in-
tuitive. While the results for donations in a large economy are closely related
to those in Vicary (2000), other results are entirely new and relate to a di⁄er-
ent set of questions: How will direct donations and net contributions depend
on wealth and heterogenous preferences? How will changes in the exogenous
variables￿ technology, wealth, and the ambient level of the public good￿ a⁄ect
the equilibrium level of the public good? And how will changes in these same
exogenous variables a⁄ect social welfare?
On one level the paper makes a general contribution to the literature on pri-
4A directory of carbon o⁄set providers can be found online at the following url:
www.carboncatalog.org/providers.
5The New York Times describes the concept behind Terrapass, one of the for-pro￿t compa-
nies that o⁄ers carbon o⁄sets, as one of the most in￿ uential ideas of 2005 (Dominus, 2005), and
the company now sells o⁄sets for automobile and air travel. The British government purchased
carbon o⁄sets for air travel required by all participants at the G8 Summit in 2005. Many
companies and organizations are using o⁄sets to reduce emissions and pursue a carbon neutral
policy; examples include The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ben & Jerry￿ s, Green Mountain Co⁄ee
Roasters, Timberland, the Rolling Stones, and the Dave Matthews Band.
2vate provision of public goods. The setup of the model is novel, and many of
the results are derived using a new approach, developed by Cornes and Hartley
(2007), for analyzing aggregative public good games. On another level the paper
makes a contribution through its application to environmental o⁄sets, which is
used throughout as a motivating and explanatory example. Speci￿c predications
are made about the extensive and intensive margins of voluntary environmental
o⁄sets, such as those for carbon dioxide emissions. The results are also informa-
tive about the ways in which changes in the technology of a polluting good will
a⁄ect the purchase of o⁄sets, environmental quality, and social welfare. Some of
the results are rather counterintuitive and are shown to have a similar structure
to that in Cornes and Sandler (1989) and Kotchen (2006). For example, it is
shown how a technology improvement that makes a polluting good more envi-
ronmentally friendly can actually diminish both environmental quality and social
welfare. Finally, it is shown that in larger economies, environmental o⁄sets will
always persist, as compensating for consumption of the polluting good becomes
even more important.
2 The Model
Assume there are i = 1;::;n individuals in the economy. Each individual has
preferences according to a strictly increasing and strictly quasiconcave utility
function Ui = Ui (xi;G), where xi is a private good and G is a public good, which
can be interpreted as environmental quality. Individuals are able to consume the
private good and directly provide the public good; however, a key feature of the
model is that consumption of xi is generally not independent of G. In particular,
consumption of each unit of xi causes a reduction in G of ￿ ￿ 0 units. Letting yi
denote each individual￿ s ￿direct provision￿of G, it follows that each individual￿ s
￿net contribution￿can be written as gi = yi ￿ ￿xi. Aggregate provision of the
public good is assumed to be G =
Pn
i=1 gi + ￿ G, where ￿ G > 0 is an initial level of
the public good, i.e., ambient environmental quality.
Each individual is endowed with exogenous wealth wi, and normalizing all








j6=i gj.6 It is convenient to rewrite the utility maximization prob-
lem with an implicit choice over the aggregate level of G. Use the second con-
6Note that if ￿ = 0 and we rescale so that ￿ G = 0, the setup of the model is equivalent to
the standard model of private provision of a pure public good.
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Figure 1: An individual￿ s budget set
straint in (1) to substitute yi out of the ￿rst constraint, and rearrange to get
pxi + G = wi + ￿ G + G￿i, where p = 1 + ￿ is the price of xi in terms of G.
This constraint is referred to as the individual￿ s ￿full-income￿budget constraint
because it accounts for personal wealth plus the value of exogenously given levels




subject to pxi + G = wi + ￿ G + G￿i; G ￿ ￿ G + G￿i ￿ ￿wi.
(2)
Figure 1 illustrates one possibility for the individual￿ s budget set. The frontier
is linear with slope ￿p. The feasible set includes quantities of G that are below
the exogenously given level, ￿ G+G￿i. This possibility di⁄ers from what is feasible
in standard models of privately provided public goods. Note that the allocation ￿
wi=p; ￿ G + G￿i
￿
is the point at which the individual has positive direct provision
but makes a net contribution of zero. This can be interpreted as the point
where, for example, enough carbon o⁄sets are purchased so that the individual￿ s
demand for driving (which causes carbon dioxide emissions) is carbon neutral.
Although not shown in the ￿gure, other possibilities are for G￿i < 0 and for the
feasible set to include levels of G that are below ￿ G. It is assumed, however, that
￿ G￿￿
Pn
i=1 wi ￿ 0. This is su¢ cient to guarantee that ￿ G+G￿i￿￿wi ￿ 0 for all i,
which eliminates the complication of having to contend with negative quantities
of the public good.
The unique solution to (2) can be written as
G = max
￿
fi (p;mi); ￿ G + G￿i ￿ ￿wi
￿
; (3)
4where fi (p;mi) is the demand function for G ignoring the inequality constraint
in (2), and mi = wi + ￿ G + G￿i is full income. Subtracting ￿ G + G￿i from both
sides, each individual￿ s optimal net contribution, or best response function, is
gi = max
￿
fi (p;m) ￿ ￿ G ￿ G￿i;￿￿wi
￿
:
The ￿nal element of the setup is the standard normality assumption in models
of privately provided public goods. The assumption simply requires that, for all
individuals, both the private and public goods are normal with respect to full
income. In particular, the assumption requires that 0 < @fi=@mi ￿ ￿ < 1 for all
i and some constant ￿.7





(1) for all i. Using the identity that g￿
i = y￿
i ￿ ￿x￿
i and the budget constraint,




i=1 that satis￿es G￿ = ￿ G +
Pn
i=1 g￿
i. The latter de￿nition is
used to prove the following proposition.8
Proposition 1 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
The equilibrium level of the public good G￿ can be either greater than or less
than the initial, ambient level ￿ G. Either case is possible because nothing prevents
the sum of net contributions
Pn
i=1 g￿
i from being positive or negative.
It is worth emphasizing that the Nash equilibrium will not, in general, be
Pareto e¢ cient. As in the standard model of a privately provided public good,
e¢ cient provision is de￿ned by the Samuelson condition, which requires that the
sum of individual marginal rates of substitution equals the marginal rate of trans-
formation (i.e., the price ratio in this case). In contrast, the Nash equilibrium,
which is consistent with the solution to (1) for all individuals, is based on indi-
vidual comparisons between their own marginal rate of substitution and the price
ratio; they are equal for those making direct donations, while other individuals
are at a corner solution. In this regard, the only di⁄erence in the model presented
here is that the implicit price ratio is a function of the technology parameter ￿.
3 Direct Provision and Net Contributions
We can solve for each individual￿ s equilibrium level of direct provision and net
contribution. In doing so, it is useful to parameterize heterogenous preferences
7The parameter ￿ is part of the normality assumption to place an upper bound on the
equilibrium level of the public good as n grows to in￿nity. In all of the analysis that follows,
only the results in section 6 rely on this part of the assumption.
8All proofs, with the exception of that for proposition 2, which is immediate from the text,
are included in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Individuals￿direct provision and net contribution
with a variable ￿ that indicates an individual￿ s type. Thus, utility functions are
written as Ui = U (xi;G;￿), and without loss of generality, ￿ can be de￿ned such
that greater values imply greater demand for G.
It must hold that G￿ = f
￿
p;wi + ￿ G + G￿
￿i;￿
￿
for all individuals at an interior
solution. Taking the inverse and adding g￿
i to both sides, we can solve for g￿
i =
wi￿pw(￿), where w(￿) = (f￿1 (G￿;￿;p) ￿ G￿)=p. To solve for y￿
i for these same
individuals, use the identity y￿
i = g￿
i + ￿x￿
i and substitute in g￿
i and the budget
constraint to ￿nd that y￿
i = wi ￿ w(￿). Combining these two results, along with
the possibility for corner solutions, proves the next proposition.






wi ￿ w(￿) if wi > w(￿)






wi ￿ pw(￿) if wi > w(￿)
￿￿wi if wi ￿ w(￿)
where w(￿) is a critical level of wealth that is decreasing in type ￿.
Figure 2 illustrates proposition 2 for a given type ￿. Note that the expression
for direct provision mirrors that for the standard model of private provision of
a public good (Andreoni 1988). If wealth is below the critical level, there is no
direct provision, but if wealth is above the critical level, direct provision equals
the di⁄erence wi ￿ w(￿). Net contributions can be negative but are constrained
such that g￿
i ￿ ￿￿wi. We can see that g￿
i ￿ 0 if and only if wi ￿ pw(￿),
6Table 1: Equilibria with di⁄erent ￿ and distributions of ￿i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
￿i= :5 ￿i2(:4;:6) ￿i2(:3;:7) ￿i2(:2;:8) ￿i2(:1;:9)
￿ = 0
G￿ 99.5 136.1 191.3 288.9 429.6
mean g￿
i .50 .68 .96 1.44 2.15
mean y￿
i .50 .68 .96 1.44 2.15
# donors 200 20 17 20 19
￿ = 1
G￿ 99.5 98.1 89.0 81.4 77.6
mean g￿
i .50 .49 .45 .41 .39
mean y￿
i 50.25 50.25 50.22 50.20 50.19
# donors 200 200 199 173 151
￿ = 2
G￿ 99.5 98.1 89.0 76.29 61.0
mean g￿
i .50 .49 .44 .38 .31
mean y￿
i 66.83 66.83 66.81 66.79 66.77
# donors 200 200 200 200 183
which is the critical level of wealth at which direct provision exactly o⁄sets the
negative a⁄ect on G that comes from the individual￿ s consumption of xi (e.g., the
point where an individual is exactly carbon neutral). At lower levels of wealth,
individual￿ s have a negative a⁄ect on G. At su¢ ciently low levels of wealth, g￿
i
is decreasing with slope ￿￿; whereas, at intermediate levels of wealth, g￿
i is still
negative but increasing with slope one, as direct provision begins to be o⁄setting.
To see the e⁄ect of heterogenous preferences, consider two di⁄erent types
￿h > ￿l with the same level of wealth. The respective critical levels of wealth will
be w(￿h) < w(￿l).9 Thus, individuals with a greater ￿ will begin direct provision





l ; but at su¢ ciently low levels of wealth, neither type will engage in direct
provision, and they will have the same negative e⁄ect on the public good.
In order to further examine the e⁄ects of heterogeneity on the Nash equilib-
rium, it is useful to consider an example. Assume there are n = 200 individuals,
each with an endowment w = 100 and Cobb-Douglas preferences of the form
Ui = x
￿i
i G1￿￿i. Table 1 characterizes the Nash equilibria under di⁄erent assump-
tions about ￿ and the distribution of ￿i. In all cases, ￿ G = 0 and the outcomes
are reported for G￿, mean g￿
i, mean y￿
i, and the number of individuals making a
9The inequality follows by construction. The variable ￿ is de￿ned such that f (p;m;￿h) >
f (p;m;￿l). Thus, f￿1 (G￿;￿h;p) < f￿1 (G￿;￿l;p), and this implies that w(￿h) < w(￿l).
7direct donation. Column (1) refers to the case in which ￿i = :5 for all i, while the
other columns refer to cases in which ￿i is randomly generated from a uniform
distribution within the indicated interval. The ￿rst scenario, with ￿ = 0, is con-
sistent with the standard model of a privately provided public good. It is clear in
this case that greater heterogeneity increases provision of the public good while
decreasing the number of donors. Note that the same pattern does not hold in
the cases where ￿ > 0.10 With greater heterogeneity, G￿ changes relatively little,
and the number of donors decreases far less quickly. This is due to the fact that
consumption of xi is no longer independent of G, so the e⁄ect of having more
individuals with a stronger preference for the public good is attenuated by also
having more individuals with a weaker preference. As some individuals are more
likely to favor private consumption, they also diminish the level of the public
good.
4 Comparative Statics
This section considers comparative static properties of the Nash equilibrium. The
analysis focuses on the ways in which changes in the exogenous variables a⁄ect
the equilibrium level of the public good G￿. Because none of the results depends
on the parameterization of heterogenous preferences, notation for ￿ is dropped
and preference heterogeneity is captured once again with subscripts i.
Let us begin with a change in ￿, that is, a change in the technology of the
private good as it relates to environmental quality. Referring back to Figure 1, we
can see that changes in ￿ shift the budget frontier like a change in the price of the
private good, as p = 1 + ￿. It follows that, for interior solutions, an individual￿ s
demand for G satis￿es @fi=@￿ = @fi=@p, and the sign of the e⁄ect will be < (>)
zero if G is a gross complement (substitute) for xi. For corner solutions, however,
there is only one possibility, as demand for the public good is G = ￿ G+G￿i￿￿wi,
which is decreasing in ￿. Combining these results, it follows that an individual￿ s
demand for G is decreasing in ￿ if either G is a gross complement for xi or the
individual is at a corner solution (i.e., yi = 0). In contrast, an individual￿ s demand
for G is increasing in ￿ if G is a gross substitute for xi and the individual is at an
interior solution (i.e., yi > 0). The next proposition shows how these comparative
statics for an individual￿ s demand translate into equilibrium results.11
Proposition 3 For all ￿ ￿ 0, a change in the technology will a⁄ect the equilib-
rium level of the public good G￿ such that (a) dG￿=d￿ < 0 if either G is a gross
10The level of provision G￿ is the same for all cases in column (1) because demand for G does
not depend on ￿ (i.e., the price of xi since p = 1 + ￿) with Cobb-Douglas preferences.
11Although the setup of the models is di⁄erent, the mechanism underlying these results is
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i + G￿:9￿￿1=:9, wi = 50,
￿ G = 10, ￿ = :35 and ￿
0 = :1.
complement for xi for all i or y￿
i = 0 for all i; or (b) dG￿=d￿ > 0 if G is a gross
substitute for xi and y￿
i > 0 for all i.
Consider a case in which there is a decrease in ￿, that is, the private good
becomes more environmentally friendly. One result is that private consumption
(weakly) increases because it is now relatively less costly. But the e⁄ect on de-
mand for environmental quality will depend on whether G is a gross complement
or substitute for xi. In the former case, environmental quality will unambiguously
increase, but in the later case, environmental quality can decrease. Figures 3 and
4 show examples of each, respectively. In both cases, the equilibrium level of the
public good changes from G￿ to G0.
It is worth emphasizing that the possibility for a decrease in G is rather coun-
terintuitive: a change in the technology that makes the private good more ￿green￿
has a detrimental e⁄ect on environmental quality. The reason is that in addition
to stimulating demand for private consumption, it also decreases demand for the
public good if G is a gross substitute for xi. Hence the decrease in direct dona-
tions can outweigh the environmental bene￿ts of the change in technology. As
the proposition suggests, however, bene￿cial e⁄ects on the environment are more
likely if environmental quality is a gross complement for private consumption and
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Figure 4: Two identical individuals with Ui = (x:4
i + G:4)
1=:4, wi = 50, ￿ G = 10,
￿ = :45 and ￿
0 = :05.
Another way of interpreting this same result is that an increase in ￿, which
implies a less green technology, can increase environmental quality. Figure 4
demonstrates this possibility with the change (in reverse) from G0 to G￿. The
intuition is that private consumption becomes more costly, and because G is a
gross substitute for xi, demand for the public good increases.
Now consider a change in ￿ G, the ambient level of the public good. A change in
￿ G will a⁄ect each individual￿ s full income, and because G is normal, it is intuitive
that a change in ￿ G will a⁄ect demand for G in the same direction. This reasoning
underlies the next equilibrium result.
Proposition 4 A change in ￿ G will a⁄ect the level of the public good G￿ such
that 0 < dG￿=d ￿ G ￿ 1.
The fact that dG￿=d ￿ G ￿ 1 re￿ ects the further assumption that xi is normal for all
i. An increase in ￿ G, for example, must stimulate demand for xi as well. The weak
inequality accounts for the possibility that all individuals are at a corner solution,
in which case dG￿ = d ￿ G. A general interpretation of proposition 4 is that, given
changes in the ambient level of the public good, there will be (weak) crowding-out
of private provision, but the crowding-out will be less than one-for-one.
A change in wi for some i has the initial e⁄ect of changing the individual￿ s
full income, but the e⁄ect on the level of the public good will depend on whether
the individual engages in direct provision.
10Proposition 5 A change in wi for some i will a⁄ect the equilibrium level of the
public good G￿ such that (a) 0 < dG￿=dwi < 1 if the inequality constraint in (2)
is not binding for individual i; or (b) ￿￿ ￿ dG￿=dwi < 0 if the constraint is
binding.
The intuition underlying proposition 5 is easy to see in the special case where
n = 1. If the individual starts at an interior solution, the normality assumption
implies that an increase in wi will increase demand for G. In contrast, if the
individual starts at a corner solution, an increase in wi will decrease demand for
G. The other bounds on both results are due to the fact that with n ￿ 2, there
is crowding out in response to individual i, but it will be incomplete. Note that
the general result here di⁄ers from the standard model of private provision of a
public good, in which case the normality assumption implies that the equilibrium
level of the public good must be nondecreasing in any individual￿ s endowment.
One respect in which the extension considered here does not di⁄er from the
standard model is the neutrality result.12 This result focuses on redistributions
of income and states that total provision of the public good is invariant to any
income redistribution that leaves the set of donors unchanged. To see how the
result continues to hold here, let D denote the set donors and use proposition 2
to write
G





i = ￿ G +
X
i2D




The neutrality result then follows immediately upon recognizing that w(￿) is
independent of the income distribution as long as the set of donors does not
change. A further and well-known implication of this same result relates to
crowding-out. Speci￿cally, government provision, which is ￿nanced through taxes
on donors that do not exceed any individual￿ s donation, will crowd-out private
provision one-for-one, leaving the level of the public good unchanged.
5 Social Welfare
A standard result in the public goods literature is that the private provision
equilibrium is not Pareto optimal, and as described previously, this result applies
here as well. But how will changes in the exogenous parameters a⁄ect social
welfare? This section expands on the comparative static analysis to consider its
welfare implications.
The e⁄ects of a change in ￿ G, which are the most straightforward, are un-
ambiguous: an increase in the ambient level of the public good, for example,
12See Warr (1983) for the original formulation and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) for
a generalization.
11results in a Pareto improvement. We have shown already that the level of the
public good increases and that crowding out is less than one-for-one. Together,
these results imply that every individual￿ s full income must increase, and this
unambiguously makes everyone strictly better o⁄.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium, a change in ￿ G will a⁄ect each individual￿ s utility
such that dUi=d ￿ G > 0 for all i.
The e⁄ect of a change in wi for some i depends once again on whether or not
individual i engages in direct provision. If, for example, the individual spends
some increased endowment on direct provision, then the level of public good
increases, and everyone is made better o⁄. But if the increased endowment is
spent on private consumption, then the level of the public good decreases, causing
the individual to be better o⁄, while everyone else is worse o⁄.
Proposition 7 In equilibrium, if the inequality constraint in (2) is not binding
for individual i, then dUj=dwi > 0 for j = 1;:::;n; however, if the inequality
constraint is binding for individual i, then dUi=dwi > 0 while dUj=dwi < 0 for
all j 6= i.
Referring back to the examples in ￿gures 3 and 4, we can see how a decrease
in ￿ can result in a Pareto improvement, regardless of whether G￿ increases or
decreases. What is perhaps a more counterintuitive result is that a decrease in ￿
can actually make all individuals worse o⁄. That is, making a private good more
environmentally friendly can actually decrease social welfare. Figure 5 shows an
example in which the level of the public good decreases and causes a negative
income e⁄ect that outweighs the positive income e⁄ect from the reduction in ￿
(i.e., in the price of xi). The result is that utility decreases for both individuals.
In general, heterogeneity of preferences and endowments means that a change
in ￿ can make some individuals better o⁄ and others worse o⁄, regardless of
whether G is a gross complement or substitute for xi. But if we consider the
special case in which all individuals have identical preferences and endowments,
we can get traction on the features that are more likely to drive the results one
way or the other. The next proposition implies that, for example, making the
private good more environmentally friendly is more likely to be welfare improving
if G is a gross complement for xi and/or if more individuals do not make a direct
donation.13
13The approach taken to prove this result follows that in Cornes and Sandler (1989), and the
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Figure 5: Two identical individuals with Ui = (x:8
i + G:8)
1=:8, wi = 50, ￿ G = 10,
￿ = :7 and ￿
0 = :1.
Proposition 8 Given an economy of n ￿ 2 identical individuals with endow-










@G if w > w￿
￿nw@U
@G if w ￿ w￿
, (4)
where w￿ is the critical level of wealth de￿ned in proposition 2.
If individuals are at a corner solution, a decrease in ￿ reduces each individual￿ s
negative externality, and the result is a Pareto improvement.14 If, however, indi-
viduals are at an interior solution, the welfare e⁄ects depend on the sign of the
￿rst expression in (4). The fact that it is negative only if @f=@p < 0 implies that
G being a gross substitute for xi is necessary but not su¢ cient for dU=d￿ > 0.
Equation (4) also implies that welfare immiserization is more likely with lower
initial consumption of xi, greater n, a larger ￿spillin e⁄ect￿captured by @f=@m,
and a larger ￿price e⁄ect￿captured by @f=@p. Note that a larger price e⁄ect is
consistent with a greater elasticity of substitution, as the contrast between the
curvature of the indi⁄erence curves in ￿gures 4 and 5 suggests.
14It is straightforward to show that this result holds even with heterogeneous preferences and
endowments.
13Although we know that the equilibrium quantity of the public good will not,
in general, be Pareto e¢ cient, it is worth considering how changes in ￿ may af-
fect the extent of underprovision. Cornes and Sandler￿ s (1996) index of ￿easy
riding￿provides a useful way to quantify underprovision of a public good. The
index is simply the ratio of equilibrium provision over e¢ cient provision, where
the latter is based on the optimum that is consistent with the shares of individ-
ual contributions implied by the equilibrium. Continuing to assume n identical
individuals with the same endowments, let us consider CES preferences of the











1 + npr ; (5)
where r = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) and it still holds that p = 1 + ￿. Because r < 1 for all
permissible values of ￿ < 1, it follows that ￿ < 1 for all n ￿ 2. Now, di⁄erentiating
(5) with respect to ￿ and rearranging, we ￿nd that @￿=@￿ = @￿=@p will have
the opposite sign of r.15 Hence @￿=@￿ > (<)0 if G and xi are gross substitutes
(complements). In this case, therefore, changes in ￿ that increase (decrease)
voluntary provision also decrease (increase) the gap between equilibrium and
e¢ cient provision. While this result need not apply more generally, the preceding
analysis demonstrates how, given interior solutions, understanding the e⁄ects of
changes in ￿ on social welfare are equivalent to understanding the e⁄ects of
changes in the price of private consumption in the standard public good model.
6 O⁄sets in a Large Economy
In general, the number of individuals in the economy will a⁄ect the equilibrium
level of a privately provided public good. Two fundamental results for the pure
public good model are that, as n increases to in￿nity, the aggregate level of
the public good increases to a ￿nite level and the average level of individual
provision decreases to zero (Andreoni 1988). These results do not apply, however,
if direct provision is used to compensate for provision of a public bad that comes
from consumption of another good. In such a model, Vicary (2000) shows that
the mean level of direct provision converges to a positive value, while mean net
contributions converge to zero. While the model developed here produces a result
similar to that in Vicary (2000), other results are new and directly comparable
to those in Andreoni (1988).








. The term in parentheses is
always nonpositive because r < 1; therefore, the overall expression will be positive (negative)
if r is negative (positive). A standard result for the CES utility function, moreover, is that the
two goods are gross substitutes (complements) if r less than (greater than) zero.
14Consider again the special case in which all individuals have identical prefer-
ences and endowments. The next proposition summarizes the important proper-
ties of the Nash equilibrium as the number of individuals in the economy grows
large.
Proposition 9 Given an economy of n identical individuals with endowments
w, as n ! 1, G￿ converges to a strictly positive ￿nite level, each individual￿ s
net contribution g￿ ! 0, and each individuals direct provision y￿ ! w￿=p.
This special case is su¢ cient to show the key result: direct provision remains
positive while net contributions converge to zero. To build intuition, consider
what would happen if, to the contrary, direct provision were zero. The level of the
public good would continue to decrease as individuals were added; however, this
could not continue inde￿nitely because the public good is normal. Hence there
exists a su¢ ciently large n such that direct provision must occur. It follows that,
because the public good is nonrival and nonexcludable, G converges to a ￿nite
positive level, which implies that direct provision must converge to a point where
it exactly o⁄sets the negative e⁄ect that occurs via consumption of the private
good. Again, this is the point at which, for example, an individual concerned
with climate change would purchase enough o⁄sets to be carbon neutral. The
result is re￿ ected by the way that y￿ ! w￿=p, which is the negative e⁄ect that
each individual imposes on the public good when the the full cost of xi (in terms
of G) is taken into account.16
A ￿nal observation pertains to the trajectory of G￿ as n ! 1. In the standard
pure public good model, the level of the public good increases monotonically as
the economy grows large. But this result need not apply here. It was noted in
section 2 that, for any n, the level of G￿ can be greater than or less than the initial
level ￿ G. It follows that, as n increases, the equilibrium level of the public good
can be either increasing or decreasing, depending on how demand for G compares
to ￿ G. While it can be shown that the trajectory will be monotonic with identical
individuals, even this need not hold in an economy with heterogenous preferences
or endowments.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines an additional motivation for why individuals voluntarily
provide public goods: to o⁄set other activities that have a negative e⁄ect on the
level of the public good. An important result, related to one shown previously,
16Vicary￿ s (2000) main result is that direct provision converges to a positive value, but he
does not solve for the value to which it converges.
15is that direct provision of the public good will persist even in large economies,
as the incentive for o⁄sets grows even stronger. Other results are new and com-
parable to those from the standard model of private provision of a pure public
good. The Nash equilibrium is solved explicitly to show how individual direct
donations and net contributions depend on wealth and heterogenous preferences.
The comparative static analysis demonstrates how the equilibrium level of the
public good and social welfare depend on the technology, individual wealth, and
the initial level of the public good. The possible e⁄ects of changes in technology
are rather counterintuitive, as a technological improvement can either increase or
decrease provision of the public good and social welfare.
Application of the model in an environmental context establishes a starting
point for understanding and making predictions about markets such as those
for carbon o⁄sets. The model shows how some individuals will not purchase
o⁄sets; and while other individuals will, they can still have either a positive or
negative e⁄ect on emissions. The special case of carbon neutrality is highlighted
in the context of more general possibilities. Implications of the comparative
static analysis relate to the possible e⁄ects of technological innovations such as
more fuel e¢ cient vehicles. The overall e⁄ect that such innovations will have on
emissions will depend on how they change the incentives for o⁄sets. Important
factors to consider are the proportion of individuals that purchase o⁄sets and
whether demand for the private good is a complement or substitute for concern
about climate change. Finally, the model provides a theoretical explanation for
why we see the emergence of markets for individual purchases of carbon o⁄sets
despite the fact that climate change is such a large and growing problem.
A possible direction for future research is to consider the consequences of
combining the incentive for o⁄sets with other motives for voluntary provision
of a public good. With environmental o⁄sets, for example, it is easy to see
how motives associated with social approval or signalling could be important.
This would explain why those selling carbon o⁄sets for vehicles typically provide
window decals and bumper stickers that enable customers to advertise the fact
that they purchased an o⁄set. At the same time, people might obtain a feeling
of warm-glow satisfaction from the act of purchasing an o⁄set, but this raises
the further question of whether they also feel guilty about being responsible
for pollution. Future research that systematically addresses these topics would
further our understanding of voluntary provision of public goods in general and
environmental o⁄sets in particular.
16Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
De￿ne the function hi
￿




fi (p;mi); ￿ G + G￿i ￿ ￿wi
￿
. Let
ai = hi(wi;￿; ￿ G￿￿
P
j6=i wj), which is individual i￿ s demand for the public good
if all other individuals spend their wealth on the private good only. For G ￿ ai,
de￿ne ri implicitly with G = hi (wi;￿;G ￿ ri). Thus, G ￿ ri = ￿ G + G￿i is
the exogenously given level of the public good that causes individual i to de-
mand G and make net contribution gi = ri. By the implicit function theo-
rem, ri = ri (wi;￿;G) is a well-de￿ned and continuous function. By de￿nition
ri (wi;￿;ai) = ai ￿ ￿ G + ￿
P
j6=i wj, and @ri=@G = 1 ￿ 1=(@hi=@G￿i) ￿ 0. Now
de￿ne a = maxfaig
n
i=1. For G ￿ a, let R(w;￿;G) =
Pn
i=1 ri. Clearly, R is
continuous and @R=@G ￿ 0. It is also true that R(w;￿;a)+ ￿ G ￿ a. This follows
because the left hand side can be rewritten as a+
P
j6=i [￿wj + rj (wj;￿;a)], where
individual i is the one for whom ai = a, and it must hold that rj ￿ ￿￿wj for all
j. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem and monotonicity of R, there exists
a unique G￿ that satis￿es R(w;￿;G￿)+ ￿ G = G￿, and g￿
i = ri (wi;￿;G￿) speci￿es
a unique equilibrium strategy for all i. QED
Proof of Propositions 3, 4, and 5
The general approach is to begin with the equilibrium condition that is established
in the proof of proposition 1: R(w;￿;G￿)+ ￿ G = G￿. Di⁄erentiating with respect


















The task, then, is to determine the sign of this expression for k = ￿, ￿ G, or wi for
some i. We have already shown that @R=@G￿ ￿ 0, so the denominator is greater
than or equal to one in all cases. It is clear that if k = ￿ G, then d ￿ G=dk = 1,
otherwise d ￿ G=dk = 0. Thus, the sign of (6) for each k will depend on @R=@k.










where ￿ G￿i = ￿ G + G￿i. Using the de￿nition of hi the result follows immediately
from equation (6), the normality assumption, and the implications of G being
either a gross compliment or substitute for xi for all i.
Prop 4.￿ Holding G constant while changing ￿ G implies that @ri=@ ￿ G = 0,
which implies that @R=@ ￿ G = 0. This result combined with equation (6) proves
proposition 4.
17Prop. 5￿ If the inequality constraint in (2) is not binding for individual i,
then @ri=@wi = @R=@wi = 1 and @R=@G￿ < 0. These facts combined with (6)
prove the ￿rst part of proposition 5. If the inequality constraint is binding for
individual i, then @ri=@wi = @R=@wi = ￿￿, and this combined with (6) proves
the second part of proposition 5. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
Because utility is strictly increasing in mi, it is su¢ cient to show that dm￿
i=d ￿ G > 0
for all i. By de￿nition dm￿
i=d ￿ G = dG￿
￿i=d ￿ G + 1. Taking the di⁄erential of equa-
tion (3), solving for dG￿
￿i=d ￿ G, and substituting it in implies that dm￿




i=d ￿ G = dG￿=d ￿ G + 1 for an interior or corner solu-
tion, respectively. The normality assumption and proposition 4 imply that both
expressions are strictly greater then zero. QED
Proof of Proposition 7
We can prove the results in terms of changes in dm￿
j=dwi for j = 1;:::;n. By
de￿nition dm￿
j=dwi = dG￿
￿j=dwi + dwj=dwi. Taking the di⁄erential of equa-
tion (3), solving for dG￿
￿j=dwi, and substituting it in implies that dm￿
j=dwi =
(dG￿=dwi)=(@fj=@G￿j) if the inequality constraint is not binding; otherwise
dm￿
j=dwi = (dG￿=dwi)+(dwj=dwi)(1 + ￿). The proposition follows immediately
from these expressions combined with the normality assumption and proposition
4. QED
Proof of Proposition 8
If w < w￿, each individual￿ s utility is Ui = U
￿
w; ￿ G ￿ n￿w
￿
. Take the dif-
ferential and solve for dU=d￿ to get the ￿rst expression in (4). If w ￿ w￿,
then G￿ = f
￿
1 + ￿;w + ￿ G + (n ￿ 1)G￿=n
￿
. Take the di⁄erential and solve for
dG￿=d￿ = (@f=@p)=[1 ￿ (@f=@m)n=(n ￿ 1)]. Next, take the di⁄erential of the
budget constraint and solve for dx￿
i = ￿(x￿
id￿ + dg￿
i)=p. Also, take the dif-
ferential of Ui = U (x￿
i;G￿) and use the fact that Uxi=UG = p to solve for
dUi = (@U=@G)(pdx￿
i + dG￿). Finally, substitute dx￿
i and dG￿=d￿ into dUi and
solve for dU=d￿ to get the second expression in (4). QED
Proof of Proposition 9
Let G￿
n denote the equilibrium level of the public good, and let w￿
n denote the
critical level of wealth de￿ned in proposition 2. If w ￿ w￿
n, then G￿
n = ￿ G￿n￿w ￿
f
￿
p;w + ￿ G ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿w
￿
. As n increases, the left hand side of the inequality
decreases at rate ￿￿w and the right hand side at rate ￿(@f=@m)￿w. Thus, by
18the normality assumption, there exists a su¢ ciently large n such that w ￿ w￿
n
can no longer hold, and it must be true that w > w￿




n)=p, which can be written more compactly as w￿
n = ￿(G￿
n). Tak-
ing the inverse, we have G￿
n = ￿
￿1 (w￿
n), which is ￿nite because w > w￿
n and the
normality assumption implies that 0 < d￿
￿1=dw ￿ ￿p=(1 ￿ ￿). By proposition
2, G￿
n = ￿ G+n(w ￿ pw￿








It follows that, as n ! 1, we have w￿
n ! w=p. Hence g￿
n ! 0 and y￿
n ! w￿=p,
and we have G￿
n ! ￿
￿1 (w=p) > 0. QED
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